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Abstract 
Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has been characterized by deindustrialization. 
Conventional economists argue that this is due to a bad environment for business decision 
making. This paper provides a classical explanation for deindustrialization, the failure to 
solve the food problem. That is, food staple prices have risen rapidly resulting in labor 
becoming costly, although physically abundant. This has prevented the evolution of a 
comparative advantage in labor intensive manufacturing. Structural change is an important 
element of the process of economic development, especially in the early stages. 
Productivity grows by shifting labor out of agriculture where productivity is low, and into 
industry or manufacturing where labor productivity is high. However, there is not just a 
comparative static productivity gain from structural change. It also seems that there is a 
dynamic gain as well. Unconditional convergence in labor productivity does tend to occur 
in manufacturing. That is, once a manufacturing sector is established in a less developed 
region, labor productivity in that sector tends to converge to that found in that same sector 
in developed countries. Thus, aggregate (economy wide) convergence generally fails to 
occur in many low income countries because manufacturing remains much too small a 
share in the overall economy. There is a dynamic gain in labor productivity that results 
from successful structural change. Indeed the process described above seems to be a very 
good description of the development process in East and Southeast Asia. These countries 
managed to shift labor into labor intensive manufacturing and industry, a large part of 
which was produced for export. This led to dramatic increases in the rate of growth of per 
capita income as well as a dramatic reduction in overall levels of poverty. 
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Recently, economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has risen dramatically. Beginning in the 
1990s a number of economic reforms occurred and there was rapid growth in the demand for raw 
materials and resources resulting from rapid Chinese growth. These factors resulted in a significant 
rise in growth rates of GDP per capita throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the 
puzzling thing about this economic growth is that it has been accompanied by a lack of growth in 
manufacturing and perhaps even a deindustrialization of the economy, with the share of 
manufacturing and industry in GDP declining over time (reword SD). Compared to the East and 
Southeast Asian experience this is a significant anomaly. It would seem to indicate that the recent 
growth in the region is fragile in nature and not likely to persist. How does one explain this 
anomaly? This is a very important question since China’s rapid economic development is opening 
up significant opportunities.  
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Specifically, unit labor costs are beginning to rise in China implying that China is shifting 
out of the production of low end (labor intensive) manufactured and industrial goods and is moving 
up the technological ladder by producing technologically more sophisticated (capital intensive, 
physical as well as human capital) products. Thus opportunities exist for Sub-Saharan Africa to 
shift into labor intensive, export oriented manufacturing and industry. However, the slow 
development of industry and the deindustrialization process (reword SD) the region is undergoing 
would seem to indicate that this opportunity is being or will be lost. Why is this process, 
deindustrialization, occurring ? Conventional analysis has usually argued that this failure is the 
result of governance issues, lack of investment in infrastructure and education, and a lack of 
openness to trade and foreign investment. However, a number of countries in East and Southeast 
Asia have managed to achieve rapid growth under similar circumstances. It will be argued, that 
classical economics is more useful in trying to explain why Africa has de-industrialized and the 
relevance of the classical model is related to a lack of institutional evolution.  
Deindustrialization 
What is deindustrialization ? Williamson and Clingingsmith (2005) have developed the 
following explanation of the term : they assumed an economy in which two goods are produced 
(agriculture and manufacturing) utilizing three inputs: labor, land, and capital. Labor is used to 
produce both goods while capital is specific to manufacturing and land to agriculture. In this 
context, absolute deindustrialization occurs when labor moves out of the manufacturing sector and 
into the agricultural sector. Thus the absolute number of workers in manufacturing declines while 
that in agriculture rises. In a many sector model absolute deindustrialization would generally 
involve a fall in the number of workers in manufacturing. Relative deindustrialization occurs when 
the share of total employment in manufacturing declines, while the share of agriculture expands. 
In the context of a many sector model, relative deindustrialization involves a fall in the share of 
manufacturing in total employment.  
One can make a similar sort of analysis by focusing on the share of manufacturing in total 
GDP. Thus absolute deindustrialization would be represented by a decline in real total 
manufacturing. Alternatively, relative deindustrialization occurs when the share of manufacturing 
in total GDP declines over time. Deindustrialization in terms of employment and production are 
likely to be related. Those countries for which manufacturing output as a share of GDP is declining 
are likely to be those countries for which manufacturing employment as a share of overall 
employment is also likely to decline. 
One could interpret the concept of deindustrialization in a broader sense. In this 
interpretation manufacturing as a share of GDP or employment may not fall, instead it may remain 
stable or even increase, but to a much lesser degree than another sector, in particular services. This 
generally occurs while an economy attains a fairly high level of GDP per capita. However, this 
can be quite problematic if it begins to occur at much lower levels of income. Why problematic? 
Such a premature shift into services may limit future productivity growth. One can think of this as 
deindustrialization in the sense that the more common pattern experienced by developing nations 
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is that initially structural change involves a shift of production and employment into manufacturing 
and industry and only later into services. Thus, the process by which the manufacturing stage is 
skipped can also be thought of deindustrialization.  
As growth has occurred over time in Sub-Saharan Africa, so has deindustrialization. Data 
concerning this issue is difficult to find. deVries, Timmer, and deVries (2013) have developed a 
useful data set for examining these issues. This data set covers eleven Sub-Saharan African nations 
for the period 1960 to 2010. It includes data on gross value added at nominal, real, and international 
prices as well as information on employment by sector of the economy. This data allows an 
examination of the issues discussed above, especially those pertaining to structural change. 
In Table One, data is presented on value added, employment, and relative labor 
productivity by sector of the economy. The data for value added and employment represents each 
sector’s proportion of the economy’s total value added and employment. With respect to relative 
productivity levels, this represents the ratio of the sector’s labor productivity level to the total 
economy’s productivity level. A 0.5 for agriculture implies that this sectors labor productivity was 
half of that for the whole economy. Examining the data one can see that agriculture has certainly 
followed the typical pattern in terms of structural change. Agriculture’s share in value added and 
employment has significantly declined over time. However, labor productivity in agriculture has 
lagged behind that of the rest of the economy. 
 
Table 1 
Value added, employment, and relative labor productivity by sector 
   Sectoral Shares   Relative 
       Productivity Levels Sector Value Added Employment 
 1960 1975 1990 2010 1960 1975 1990 2010 1960 1975 1990 2010 
Agriculture 37.6 29.2 24.9 22.4 72.7 66.0 61.6 49.8   0.5   0.4   0.4   0.4 
Industry 24.3 30.0 32.6 27.8   9.3 13.1 14.3 13.4   4.4   3.7   3.5   2.6 
Mining   8.1   6.2 11.2   8.9   1.7   1.5   1.5   0.9 15.7 22.4 23.3 19.5 
Manufacturing   9.2 14.7 14.0 10.1   4.7   7.8   8.9   8.3   2.5   2.8   2.4   1.6 
Other Industry   7.1   9.2   7.3   8.9   3.0   3.8   3.9   4.2   8.5   5.8   5.3   2.9 
Services 38.1 40.7 42.6 49.8 18.0 20.9 24.1 36.8   2.7   2.5   2.4   1.6 
Total 
Economy 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0 
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When focusing on the industrial sector several anomalies appear (word choice SD). 
Looking at the industrial sector as a whole, the share of value added seems to have risen between 
1960 and 1990. However, after that there is a decline. Examining the subcategories under industry 
one can see that manufacturing actually begins to decline after 1975. In terms of employment, 
employment shares in both industry and manufacturing rise until 1990 and then decline. 
Examining relative productivity a similar story emerges. Overall productivity in industry is 
significantly greater than that found in the overall economy, but this overall advantage begins to 
decline as after 1975. Manufacturing follows a similar pattern. 
Finally, the sector which has expanded most rapidly has been the service sector. It has 
grown both in terms of value added and employment shares. Looking at relative labor productivity, 
one can see that this sector is more productive than the economy as a whole, but not to the extent 
of industry. Also relative productivity has fallen over time. Lastly, relative labor productivity in 
services was certainly higher than that of agriculture throughout the time period. 
So what conclusions can be drawn from this data? First, relative deindustrialization seems 
to have occurred both in terms of employment and value added. Second, deindustrialization has 
also seemed to occur in the sense that structural change seems to have skipped over industry with 
the service sector taking up the unused capacity in terms of both production and employment. The 
picture of structural change in Sub-Saharan Africa can be described in the following manner. 
Agriculture has shrunk in terms of both production and employment. Much of this production and 
employment has shifted into the service sector, not the industrial sector (nor manufacturing). The 
shift in labor has been from a low productive sector, agriculture, to a higher productive sector, 
services. However, the gain in productivity seems to have been much less than that which would 
have occurred from a shift to industry. Even more importantly, productivity growth in services is 
much lower than that in industry.  We can describe this type of structural change as generating 
static gains at the expense of dynamic losses (deVries, et al., 2013). 
 
Table 2 
Sectoral Composition Real GDP 
Year        Primary        Industry        Services        Construction        Infrastructure 
1888       41.5       8.1   46.3      2.6           1.5 
1900       34.6     11.3   47.5      3.5           3.1 
1910       31.5       5.4   42.8      4.0           6.3 
1920       24.7     19.0   43.2      3.4           9.7 
1930       20.7     24.0   35.6      4.9         14.6 
1938       15.9     32.4   32.3      6.9         12.3 
Note. Adapted from: Teranishi (2005). 
 
 
This pattern is much different than that found in the successful cases in Asia, particularly 
in East Asia. Japan represents the first non-Western nation to converge to developed country 
standards of living. This process began before World War II and accelerated thereafter. The focus 
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here will be on the prewar period and data on the sectoral composition of GDP in the prewar period 
is presented in Table Two. As one can see, the share of primary production declines throughout 
the period while that for industry rises. Employment trends followed trends in sectoral GDP as 
well. Structural change involved a shift from agriculture to industry. 
South Korea too has managed to converge towards developed countries’ living standards 
with rapid growth beginning in the 1960s. Table Three provides some information concerning the 
structural change process. As one can see, agriculture declined both as a share of GDP and 
employment from 1962 to 1980, while the share of industry in these two categories rose 
dramatically in tandem with the service sector. Thus economic development was accompanied by 
a shift of labor out of agriculture and into industry and manufacturing. 
 
Table 3 
Structural Change - South Korea 
     1962 1970 1980 
Agriculture 
% of GDP   39.8  29.7  17.8 
% of Employment  63.1  50.4  34.0 
Industry 
% of GDP   14.6  19.7  25.3 
% of Employment    8.7  14.3  22.6 
Services 
% of GDP   45.6  50.6  56.8 
% of Employment  28.2  35.2  43.4 
  __________________________________ 
Note. Adapted From: Looney (2012) 
 
Finally, Taiwan has been able to converge to a standard of living similar to that found in 
developed countries. Rapid growth began in the 1960s and it was also accompanied by dramatic 
structural change with agriculture declining in importance both in terms of GDP and employment. 
This was accompanied by growth in both industry and services as shares of GDP and employment. 
These results are reflected in Tables Four and Five. 
The contrast between the structural changes experienced by East Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa are quite stark. In East Asia, the shift out of agriculture was accompanied by the expansion 
of industry and in most instances services too. Alternatively, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced 
relative deindustrialization in terms of both GDP and employment. The rapid expansion of 
manufacturing has failed to occur. It appears that industrialization has been skipped. 
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Table 4 
Structural Change in GDP -Taiwan 
 Year       Agriculture  Industry Services Total 
1952            36.0     18.0     46.0   100 
1956            31.9     22.4     46.0   100 
1960            32.9     24.9     42.2   100 
1964            28.3     28.9     42.8   100 
1968            22.1     32.6     45.4   100  
1972            14.2     40.3     45.5   100 
1980   9.2     44.7     46.1   100 
1988   6.1     46.2     47.7   100 
Note. Adapted From: Mao and Schive (1995) 
 
Table 5 
Structural Change in Employment -Taiwan 
 Year       Agriculture  Industry Services Total 
1952            56.1      16.9      27.0   100 
1956            53.2      18.3      28.5    100 
1960            50.2      20.5      29.3    100 
1964            49.5      21.3      29.2    100 
1968            40.8      25.4      33.8    100  
1972            33.0      31.8      35.2    100 
1980            19.5     42.4      38.1   100 
1988            13.7     42.6      43.7   100 
Note. Adapted From: Mao and Schive (1995) 
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Why has Sub-Saharan Africa Failed to Develop a Comparative  
Advantage in Industry (manufacturing)? 
 
Explanations: Conventional and Classical 
Conventional Perspective 
Conventional perspectives on Sub-Saharan Africa’s failure to evolve a productive 
industrial sector tend to focus on issues of policy and governance. With respect to policy, it is often 
noted that after World War II and the successful move to independence, many of the new 
governments pursued a state centered process of economic development that has come to be known 
as import substitution industrialization (ISI). This approach to industrialization sought to protect 
or subsidize industrial production. Many of these countries had comparative advantages in a 
variety of primary types of goods, often based on minerals and other sorts of natural resources. 
The ISI strategy involved policies that shifted resources out of sectors in which these countries 
were relatively efficient and into sectors in which production was inefficient. 
The policies utilized were quite varied. Tariffs and quotas were used to provide protection 
to domestic manufacturing firms. Foreign exchange controls were imposed so as to allow the state 
to control foreign exchange and direct it to sectors which were being promoted. In some instances, 
state ownership and control of specific sectors was undertaken to allow the state to directly manage 
resource allocation. Agriculture was often neglected in terms of investment since productivity 
there tended to be quite low. In addition, the state often created parastatal institutions for the 
marketing of important agricultural goods. This allowed the state to use monopsony power to push 
down the relative prices of these agricultural goods. This effectively transferred resources to the 
non-agricultural sector (Anderson and Masters, 2009). 
The results of ISI have been viewed negatively. As was discussed in Table One, the share 
of industry in GDP and employment did rise, but not dramatically. The protected sectors of the 
economy remained largely inefficient. From a dynamic perspective this strategy seemed to fail. 
International indebtedness rose dramatically among the nations of the region eventually resulting 
in an economic collapse. Beginning in the 1990s many countries in the region underwent structural 
adjustment programs under the direction of various international institutions. In this process tariffs 
and quotas were reduced, exchange rates reformed and devalued, state ownership was reduced in 
extent, and marketing boards dismantled. The extent of protection of industry and manufacturing 
was dramatically reduced and the extent of discrimination against the agricultural sector was 
reduced. This has, according to some, laid the foundation for the rapid economic growth 
experienced by the region over the last fifteen years. Policy changes are seen to be the key in 
integrating Africa with the international economy and promoting rapid growth (Sachs and Warner, 
1997). 
The failure of manufacturing/industry to rapidly grow even during the recent period of 
rapid overall growth is often attributed to problems of governance or the bad business environment 
that results from flawed governance. Problems involving governance are often manifested in 
widespread corruption in government institutions. This results in misallocated investment, waste, 
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and slower growth. Resources are utilized to the benefit of small groups of powerful political elites. 
Authoritarian political structures dominate and there are few checks on the use of power. 
Bad business environments are also the result of the lack of infrastructure in many Sub-Saharan 
countries. The lack of infrastructure, including power generation and distribution, limits the spread 
of modern manufacturing firms. In addition, the red tape and bureaucracy limits entrepreneurial 
decision-making and inhibits investment in modern manufacturing firms. This results in 
productivity enclaves, “islands of high productivity in a sea of smaller low productivity firms.” 
(Gelb, et al., 2014). 
The solution to the problems of corruption and the existence of a bad business environment 
are thought by many to involve political reform. This reform would involve the expansion of 
pluralism via the construction of democratic institutions and practices. In fact, better recent policies 
and economic performance have been at least partly linked to significant political reform (Ndulu 
and O’Connell, 1999). 
The conventional or neoclassical perspective is undermined by the fact that most of the 
economically successful countries of East and Southeast Asia were faced with similar initial 
conditions. Governance issues and corruption in these countries, result in environments that limit 
the development of manufacturing. Democracy and pluralism did not precede rapid growth and 
the development of labor intensive manufacturing. In most cases, it was the exact opposite. South 
Korea and Taiwan industrialized under authoritarian regimes as has China. Japan began its 
industrialization process (prior to World War II) under a political regime which was authoritarian 
in nature, even though there were some aspects of democratic institutions in existence. 
Classical Perspective 
A relatively modern version of classical analysis in development economics is represented 
by the work of Lewis (1954). He developed a model composed of two sectors: traditional and 
modern. The traditional sector was mainly distinguished by how production units make decisions. 
He argued that output in this sector was shared in a manner such that each worker receives their 
average product. Only labor and land are used in the production process and no capital is utilized 
or accumulated (saving and investment are zero). Finally, no technological innovation occurs in 
the staple food production. 
The modern sector will be assumed to represent manufacturing. Profits are maximized with 
wage being equal to the marginal product of labor. Capital and labor are utilized in the production 
process with the former being accumulated via savings and investment. In the Model, technical 
change does not occur. Within this scheme, economic growth can only arise via structural change. 
The marginal product of labor in the traditional sector is assumed to be zero (surplus labor), while 
manufacturing is positive. As capital is accumulated in the modern sector, labor shifts from the 
sector where productivity is low to the sector where it is high (manufacturing) and growth occurs 
with labor productivity rising (per capita income). 
Difficulties arise when surplus labor is exhausted. When this occurs continued expansion 
of manufacturing implies that food production declines and the relative price of food rises. Wages 
in the manufacturing sector must rise in order to cover the increased cost of food. This will tend to 
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reduce profits and slow or perhaps halt structural change (and thus growth) altogether. In addition, 
the production technology in the modern sector is likely to become more capital intensive, further 
slowing structural change. 
There are several drawbacks to this analysis. First, as outlined above, the economy is closed 
to the outside world. Results are likely to alter if one allows trade. Second, the concept of surplus 
labor is controversial to say the least. Third, the growth process is structural in nature with no 
allowance for technical change. Within this limited context though, a simple implication does 
emerge. Labor may be physically abundant, but not economically cheap due to the rising cost of 
food. In this situation, manufacturing may very well fail to develop because food becomes 
increasingly expensive and what manufacturing that does develop is likely to be more capital 
intensive and less labor intensive in nature.  
One can easily eliminate the surplus labor assumption and assume labor is paid its marginal 
product. Eswaran and Kotwal (2004) have constructed a dualistic model in which the expenditure 
patterns of households are dependent on income. Specifically, at low income levels all income is 
spent on food, however once income attains a specific threshold, an increasing share is spent on 
manufacturing. As savings and capital accumulation occur in the modern sector, income rises and 
households begin pending an increasing proportion of their income on manufactured goods. 
However, whether this structural change process continues still depends on what happens to 
productivity in the food sector. If productivity remains unchanged, then output in food production 
will decline as labor moves into manufacturing. The rising price of food is likely then to stop the 
expansion of the modern sector since the real wage in manufacturing will have to dramatically 
rise. Rapid growth in agricultural productivity will keep food prices down and allow structural 
transformation. 
Given the dynamic characteristics of manufacturing, structural change from agriculture to 
manufacturing is crucial to development. Rodrik (2013) has shown that unconditional productivity 
convergence does tend to occur in manufacturing. That is, although the labor productivity of newly 
established manufacturing firms is likely to be low by the international standards of developed 
countries, the productivity of the sector quickly tends to converge to international standards of 
productivity. The shift from agriculture to manufacturing in the development process creates static 
gains. Labor moves from low to high productivity activities. But, dynamic gains in labor 
productivity in manufacturing tend to grow rapidly. The key to this process involves raising 
productivity in staple foods so as to allow structural change to occur. 
Up to this point, the dualistic model under discussion is closed in nature. However, the 
implications of low productivity in staple food production persist within the context of a semi-
open economy. This idea was originally developed by Myint (1975). A semi-open economy is one 
in which part of the domestic economy remains insulated from foreign trade while part of the 
economy is fully open to trade. In this case, the food producing sector is presumed to be closed to 
trade while manufacturing is open. It is, at this point, useful to presume that agriculture can be 
divided into two sectors, a closed sector producing food and a commercial agricultural sector that 
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produces an export product utilizing labor and land (a comparative advantage in this product 
exists). 
In this context economic growth can occur in a variety of ways. For example, an exogenous 
increase in this demand for the commercial agricultural product (in terms of trade improvement) 
would cause resources (labor) to shift out of staple food production and into export production. 
However, it will also draw resources from the tradable modern manufacturing sector with imports 
of manufacturing goods rising. However, if food productivity does not increase rapidly enough, 
the comparative advantage of the commercial, export oriented agricultural sector will decline and 
the comparative disadvantage of manufacturing will increase as wage increases occur as a result 
of the rise in staple food prices. Structural change (into manufacturing) will be stymied, 
deindustrialization will occur. 
An alternative process of economic growth could occur if government policy is used to 
subsidize the expansion of manufacturing (initially this sector is characterized by comparative 
disadvantage). The resulting expansion of this sector will draw labor from both staple food 
production and export production, but if agricultural productivity stagnates, then rising wages will 
reduce the comparative advantage in the commercial export crop and eventually prevent the 
structural transformation of the economy via a shift into manufacturing. Structural change is found 
to be crucially dependent on growth in food productivity. 
Does it make sense to think that the staple food producing sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa are closed 
to trade? Gollin, et al. (2007) has argued that for many Sub-Saharan nations the staple food sector 
is to all intents and purposes a closed sector. Data from the FAO indicates that most poor countries 
meet their demand for food from domestic production. Thus Gollin, et al. (2007) concludes that 
“it is reasonable to view most economies as closed from the perspective of trade in food”. This 
conclusion seems to be even more relevant for the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the food 
staples for these countries are not extensively traded. Delgado, et al. (2004) argues that the cost of 
transporting and marketing staple foods isolates this type of production from international markets. 
Even when staple foods are traded, the markets for these goods are often quite thin. That 
is, of total production of a particular staple worldwide, the percent that is actually traded is quite 
small. As a result, changes in purchases on the international market by relatively small food 
importers can still have dramatic effects on the price of such staples. Thus the price of staple foods 
cannot be assumed to be an exogenous variable. Instead, it must be stipulated to be endogenously 
determined in any model purporting to explain structural change. 
A number of hypotheses can be put forward based upon analysis within the content of the 
semi-open economy developed in this section. The deindustrialization of Sub-Saharan Africa 
should be associated with slow growth in food staple production. Rapid growth over the last decade 
or so should have resulted in rapid increases in staple food prices. Finally, although Africa is 
characterized as being incresingly labor abundant, one should expect to find that labor is not 
relatively cheap in this region.  
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Empirical Evidence 
Whether successful transformation occurs as growth takes place depends on whether 
productivity in food production rises and keeps pace with the growth of the modern manufacturing 
sector. Data on food production per capita for Sub-Saharan Africa is presented in Table Six 
indicating that food production per capita has generally stagnated. By the year 2009, agricultural 
output had not risen by much compared to what it was in the early 1960s. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
not experienced a “Green Revolution” as has much of East and Southeast Asia. This is likely due 
to several factors. First, much of East and Southeast Asia relied upon rice as the main wage good. 
Technical innovation that creates higher yielding seed varieties has the potential to have an impact 
over a broad graphical area. It is true that seeds must be tailored to particular soil and climatic 
conditions.  
 
Table 6 
Net food production per capita (Index) 
         Year Per Capita Year Per Capita 
           1961     100  1986        91 
         1962     103  1987        89 
         1963     104  1988        92 
         1964     103  1989        93 
         1965     102  1990        93 
         1966       99  1991        98 
         1967     104  1992        94 
         1968     103  1993        95 
         1969     104  1994        95 
         1970     105  1995        93 
         1971     106  1996      100 
         1972     102  1997        97 
         1973       98  1998        99 
         1974     103  1999      100 
         1975     101  2000      103 
         1976       99  2001      104 
         1977       95  2002      105 
         1978       95  2003      107 
         1979       93  2004      104 
         1980       93  2005      105 
         1981       93  2006      107 
         1982       91  2007      104 
         1983       88  2008      107 
         1984       86  2009      107 
         1985       90 
 
However, research into high yielding rice varieties has the potential to generate very high 
rates of return. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the situation is quite different. No single food crop serves 
as the wage good. Instead, a variety of different crops serve this function depending on which 
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region in Sub-Saharan Africa one focuses on. The net direct return to investment in research in 
any particular staple food crop research in Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be much lower than that 
for rice. This in itself will tend to reduce the incentive for private research firms to undertake 
investment. Also, public authorities are likely to be reluctant to make investments in areas where 
the direct return is so low. 
Given the wages good function of these staple foods, the benefits to society of investment 
in such research are likely to be immense. Without productivity growth in staple food production, 
the growth of labor intensive manufacturing is likely to be quite limited. This represents a situation 
in which the investment in such research is likely to be significantly below what is optimal from 
society’s point of view and this implies a significant role for the state in terms of providing 
resources for such agricultural research (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). The problem of actually 
creating an institutional structure to carry out such research will likely be more complex than that 
faced in parts of Asia.  
 
Table 7 
Consumer prices, food indices (2000 = 100) 
     Region      Food Price Index  
    World    232.5 
      Africa    354.4 
Eastern Africa   445.4 
Middle Africa                            711.2 
Western Africa   356.3 
Southern Africa  245.7 
Northern Africa  257.5 
     Americas    211.7 
Northern America  141.3 
Central America  209.8 
Caribbean   364.8 
South America   293.9 
     Asia    229.2 
Eastern Asia   188.2 
Southern Asia   255.7 
Southeastern Asia  259.4 
Western Asia   421.6 
     Europe    189.7 
Eastern Europe   293.8 
Northern Europe  148.2 
Southern Europe  149.7 
            Western Europe  128.0   
Note. Source: FAO 
 
It has been assumed in this paper that food staples are not widely traded and the price of 
food in the dualistic model is endogenously determined. If staple food was widely traded, then 
wewould see similar movement in prices in the various regions of the world. Data on food prices 
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for various regions of the world is presented in Table Seven. Consumer food price indices are 
presented for various regions of the world utilizing 2000 as the base year. Data is presented for the 
year 2013 for each region. As can be seen, from 2000 to 2013 food prices around the world have 
increased, but the patterns vary dramatically from region to region. First, world food prices have 
risen to 232.5, more than doubling. But the variation by region is large.  
The lowest increase was registered by Western Europe where prices increased very little. 
Alternatively, for Middle Africa, food prices increased by seven times from 2000-2014. Further 
examination of the table reveals that increases in food prices were highest for Middle Africa, 
Eastern Africa, Western Asia, the Caribbean, and Western Africa. Food prices followed 
dramatically different trends in various regions of the world lending support to the notion that 
limited trade in food implies food price endogeneity. Second, large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa 
experienced very rapid increases in food prices. 
Such rapid increases in the cost of food in large parts of Africa, in comparison with other 
regions of the world would, in the dualistic theoretical framework discussed above lead to labor 
being relatively costly (although it may be physically abundant). Some light can be shed on this 
issue by looking at unit labor costs which measures the ratio of wages to value added in 
manufacturing. Using data from the World Bank Enterprise surveys Ramachandran, et al. (2009) 
calculate unit labor costs for much of Sub-Saharan Africa and compare it to that for China and 
India. What they find is that except for Mali, all other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have unit 
labor cost ratios which are higher than that for India and China. 
The comparison with China is particularly enlightening. China has dominated the 
production and export of labor intensive manufactured goods. Their ability to dominate the world 
market for such products is based on their “cheap labor”, which in this case means low unit labor 
costs. The inability of Sub-Saharan Africa to compete on a unit labor cost basis indicates that the 
latter will have trouble making inroads in terms of producing and exporting labor intensive 
manufactured goods. It is possible that wages in China are being driven up as a result of rapid 
economic growth and that unit labor costs in China will rise above those in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, it would seem that the country most likely to benefit from this would more likely be 
India, rather than Sub-Saharan Africa. 
If labor is relatively more expensive in Sub-Saharan Africa, then one should find that 
manufacturing firms are more capital intensive there then they should be as firms seek to shift their 
resource combinations. Gelb, et al. (2013), using data drawn from the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys are able to calculate capital per worker ratios for formal sector firms in Africa and compare 
them with those in firms in other regions of the world. The results are presented in Table Eight. 
The interesting thing to note is that in comparison with East and South Asia, many countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa have substantially higher capital to labor ratios. Thus these firms are not likely 
to generate significant increases in employment as growth occurs. 
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Table 8 
Firm level capital to worker ratio (2005 $) 
         Region                Capital/Worker (Survey Medians)  
      Sub-Saharan Africa       
       Angola      2118 
Ethiopia       999 
Ghana        474 
Kenya       9211 
Mali         864 
      Mozambique      1906 
Nigeria        627 
Senegal      1621 
South Africa      8804 
      Tanzania      3410 
Uganda       2162 
Zambia       4007 
      East Asia 
Indonesia        665 
Philippines      3196 
Vietnam      2824 
     Europe/Central Asia 
Russia       6130 
Turkey     22090 
Ukraine      4140 
     Latin America/Caribbean 
Argentina      8867  
Brazil       6579  
Chile       7146 
Columbia      4417 
Mexico      4437 
Uruguay      5836 
     South Asia 
Bangladesh        624 
            India       1267    
Note. Adapted From: Gelb, et al. (2013) 
This section of the paper has shown a number of related things. First, food production has 
barely kept up with population growth and that dramatic increases in food productivity have yet to 
occur. Food prices in Sub-Saharan Africa have, over time, followed a different pattern when 
compared to other regions of the world. Specifically, food prices have risen dramatically faster in 
this region elative to much of the rest of the world. Unit labor costs in most Sub-Saharan African 
countries are above those found in China and India. Even adjusting for the level of GDP per capita, 
labor costs are higher in Sub-Saharan Africa. “Labor is relatively more costly in high-productivity 
firms with relatively low levels of capital intensity, the most desirable kind of a firm in a poor 
capital constrained country” (Gelb, et al., 2013, p.15). Finally, in many Sub-Saharan countries 
production in formal sector firms is relatively capital intensive. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
It has been argued in this paper that Sub-Saharan Africa, while growing rapidly by 
historical standards, is also experiencing deindustrialization. Structural change has not involved a 
dramatic shift of labor from agriculture to manufacturing. Manufacturing has instead stagnated 
and/or shrunk as a share of GDP and employment. This is important since manufacturing, once 
established, experiences catch-up in terms of labor productivity and grows rapidly approaching 
levels found in developed countries. Services, although having higher labor productivity in 
agriculture, do not seem to be characterized by absolute convergence. 
Conventional economics has argued that the inability of manufacturing to rapidly expand 
is related to the poor business environment which exists in Sub-Saharan Africa. Efforts should be 
made to reduce rules, regulations, and red tape which restrict manufacturing growth. In addition, 
corruption also makes it very difficult to establish new firms. Efforts also need to be devoted to 
expanding basic infrastructure. 
While not denying that the above are possible important factors restricting the growth of 
manufacturing, this paper, using a classical approach, focuses on a much more straight forward 
explanation. Manufacturing firms (formal sector) in the region find that labor is relatively 
expensive and as a result utilize more capital intensive technology and thus find it extremely 
difficult to develop a comparative advantage in manufacturing. Labor is increasingly abundant in 
the region due to population growth, but it is increasingly expensive due to the rapid rise in the 
cost of food. In a semi-open economy the prices of food staples are endogenous. Rapid expansion 
in modern manufacturing is restricted by the rising cost of food. Empirical evidence supporting 
these propositions was presented for the region. 
The key policy implication is very clear. Unless agricultural productivity can be rapidly 
increased, stabilizing the price of food staples, labor will remain expensive even though it is 
relatively abundant and modern, and labor intensive manufacturing growth will be limited. The 
difficulty in raising agricultural productivity is not so much technical or scientific in nature. 
Instead, the main difficulty is institutional in nature. The great diversity of staple food agriculture 
in the region implies that the research and extension system necessary to create and adapt the 
technology must be decentralized. However, funding such an institutional structure from within 
the region will create significant problems. Research into particular crops will benefit specific 
regions only. Regions dependent on a particular food staple are unlikely to support funding for 
other food crops. Economies of scale from research are likely to be limited. Significant investment 
at the regional level is likely to be required, most likely beyond the financial means of the region 
involved. Creating the institutional structure necessary to generate the technical innovation in food 
staple production will prove to be difficult. In the face of these institutional difficulties much of 
the agricultural research that has been carried out in the past has focused on non-staple agricultural 
commodities which have generally been exported. Research and development has been biased 
against staple food production. Unless this bias is altered, it is highly unlikely that rapid growth in 
manufacturing can occur. 
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